University of
Birmingham
School of Public Policy International Development Department Combating Corruption:What the Ecuadorian Anti-Corruption Agency Can Learn from International Good Practice.Student
Name: Maria del Mar Landette M. Registration
Number: 0450666 Degree Programme: MSC
Governance and Development Management Supervisor: R. Andrew Nickson Word Count: 12,000 Date: September
2002 Executive Summary Public sector corruption is a
pervasive and global phenomenon that has attracted much attention in the last
decade because of its negative effects on the development process of nations.
The costs of corruption to the economy, legitimacy and social development of a
state are very high, manifesting themselves not only in terms of slow economic
growth and inefficiency, but also causing a distortion of development programs,
weakening government institutions, increasing economic and social inequality in
society, hampering the process of reforms, and undermining democracy and the
rule of law. Governments, aided by international
development agencies, have established national anti-corruption strategies to
prevent and combat corrupt activities in the public sector. Some of these initiatives include: ·
Structural
reforms that focus on streamlining the civil service, strengthening the ethical
codes that should guide its work, strengthening financial controls and
procurement practices, and re-evaluating the needs and resources that civil
servants require to do their job properly. ·
Judicial
reform and anti-corruption legislation to create a strong and enforceable legal
framework to guide the activities of the public and private sector, and to
deter and punish corrupt behaviour. ·
Economic
liberalisation policies that minimise the opportunities for corruption by
increasing competition, transparency and accountability, and limit the
discretion and monopoly of public sector institutions in economic markets. ·
Increasing
the participation of civil society organisations and the private sector as
allies in the fight against corruption. Strategies to combat corruption are
often led by independent anti-corruption agencies created specifically to
spearhead the fight. These agencies
have proven to be successful in countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and
Botswana. Hong Kong’s Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Singapore’s Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and Botswana’s Directorate of Corruption and
Economic Crimes (DCEC) provide useful information on the characteristics and
scope of action of anti-corruption agencies that are key to the effectiveness
of their work. Some of these include: ·
A
strong, enforceable legal framework. ·
Independence
of action, resources and staff, and the power to investigate and pursue corruption
at the highest levels of government. ·
Political
and bureaucratic support, and the capacity to access information, witnesses and
documentation. ·
Community
involvement and support, and adequate accountability mechanisms that involve
civil society. The Ecuadorian Commission for the
Civic Control of Corruption (CCCC) is a relatively new agency established in
1997 as a government watchdog mechanism. Unlike ICAC, CPIB or the DCEC, it does
not have real independence of action or the power to pursue an effective
anti-corruption agenda. In order for
the CCCC to be an effective mechanism, a review of the legal framework to
support the agency’s work is crucial, as is vesting the commission with
stronger powers of investigation and the ability to search, seize, arrest
suspects and freeze assets. The
agency’s participatory model can also be an effective tool in the monitoring
and restructuring of key government control agencies and the judiciary, if the
commission is given the authority to audit the procedures and processes of
institutions, and the power to prosecute corruption cases. In Ecuador, as elsewhere, the fight
against institutionalised corruption is a long and difficult task, requiring a
collaborative effort from all the members of society, and a political
leadership that is committed to a process of deep reform and continuous
change. Corrupt behaviour is not a
‘cultural trait’ that is inherent in certain societies. It is a problem of distorted ethical, moral
and economic perceptions, which can be changed as demonstrated by countries
that have been successful in their fight against corruption. Table of Contents Executive Summary 2 Introduction 6 Chapter 1 - Costs and consequences of corruption 9 1.1 Economic costs 11 1.2 Institutional costs 13 1.3 Social costs 15 Chapter 2 - Initiatives to control corruption 18 2.1 Public
Sector reforms 20 2.2 Judicial
reform and anti-corruption legislation 24 2.3 Economic
liberalisation policies 26 2.4 Civil
society participation and the role of the private sector 29 Chapter 3
- Comparative typology of anti-corruption agencies 33 3.1 Independent Commission Against
Corruption, Hong Kong 37 3.2 Corruption Prevention Investigation
Bureau, Singapore 40 3.3 Directorate of Corruption and
Economic Crimes, Botswana 45 3.4 Civic Commission for the Control of
Corruption, Ecuador 49 Chapter 4 - Anti-Corruption Agencies: Good Practice Guidelines 56 Chapter 5
- Conclusion 61 Annex
1. Corruption Perception Index, 2001 63 Annex 2. Letter
written by the author to the Director, JFK
School of Government, Harvard University 66 Bibliography 67 Introduction The topic of corruption has
sustained increased interest during the past decade as part of the discussion
of good governance and government reform.
The realisation that corruption is a complex issue that affects both
developed and developing countries has triggered efforts at both the
international and national levels to develop mechanisms to control
corruption. These efforts have included
the establishment of international anti-corruption conventions and agreements,
(OECD 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention; OAS 1996 Inter-American Convention against
Corruption), the work of international development agencies supporting reforms
to curb corruption (World Bank 1997a,b; UNDP 1997), and the exposure of corrupt
countries and bribe-paying companies by NGOs such as Transparency
International. At the national level, governments
have introduced anti-corruption legislation to regulate the activities of both
the public and private sector, have enacted economic and civil service reforms
as mechanisms to control corruption in the public sector, and have created or
strengthened watchdog organisations to investigate and punish the misuse of
power by those in public office. The core of this dissertation is the
analysis of one of these watchdog mechanisms, namely anti-corruption agencies
and their effectiveness as tools to combat corruption in the public
sector. In order to do this, the cases
of the national anti-corruption agencies of Hong Kong, Singapore, Botswana and
Ecuador are examined, and key variables in their structure and
organisational arrangements compared to determine best practices that can be applied
by the Ecuadorian anti-corruption agency in its fight against public sector
corruption. The first
chapter of this dissertation provides a brief background into public sector
corruption, its costs and consequences.
The costs of corruption are examined in three different dimensions: the
economic costs, the institutional costs, and the social costs. In each section the consequences to the
nation-state of corrupt activities are looked at, utilizing a review of current
literature by authors who have analysed the impact of corruption in each of
these areas. The first section studies
the devastating effects that corruption has on the economic development of the
state, hampering investment, creating inefficiency, increasing costs, and
especially misallocating resources that are critical to economic growth. From an institutional perspective, the
second section considers the effects of corruption on the legitimacy of the
state, and the possibility of capture of the state’s resources by organised
criminal groups, along with the consequences for democracy and good
governance. Finally, from a social
perspective, the effect of corruption on social development, citizenship and
civil society participation is examined. The second chapter focuses on national initiatives to control corruption. These initiatives include public sector reforms, judicial reform and anti-corruption legislation, economic liberalisation policies, civil society participation and the role of the private sector. Each of these initiatives are considered separately, where they stem from, what are their main components and how these strategies are key in a holistic approach to combat corruption. The third chapter provides
a comparative typology of anti corruption agencies in Hong- Kong, Singapore, Botswana
and Ecuador. The comparison includes a discussion of the background
leading to the creation of these agencies, and a matrix of their
characteristics: internal structure, legal framework, scope of action,
and other key organisational arrangements.
From these characteristics, and the analysis of their activities,
conclusions are drawn regarding the effectiveness of the institutional
arrangements of these agencies that support or impede their work against corruption. The fourth
chapter tries to gather good practice guidelines identified in Chapter 3 that
can be applied to the conditions found in Ecuador, suggesting a variety of
fundamental considerations relating to the effectiveness of the Ecuadorian
anti-corruption institution, and its success.
The research for this dissertation
was partially based on the analysis of current literature related to
corruption, anti-corruption initiatives and anti-corruption agencies, and a
field study, including interviews conducted in Ecuador. The main source for the information on the
Ecuadorian anti-corruption agency was provided by the agency itself. I am especially grateful to the Director of
Investigations of the CCCC, Rafael Gutierrez, who not only provided relevant public
data, but also a candid discussion of the real issues behind the problem of
systemic corruption in Ecuador. Chapter 1 - Costs and
Consequences of Corruption It is now widely accepted that
corruption is the ‘cancer’ of the modern state, limiting economic growth,
hampering investment, and reducing the effectiveness of development programs,
while diverting important, and often scarce public resources, towards distorted
political priorities. Although there
are many definitions of public sector corruption in the literature, two
definitions are very useful in creating a boundary for the discussion of this
topic. The first is “the abuse by public sector officials of
entrusted power, for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which they
owe allegiance” (Williams and Doig, 2000: 55). The second is more simple and straightforward: “the abuse of
public office for private gain” (World Bank, 1997a: 12). Corruption, as Robert Klitgaard
describes it, happens when “agents have a monopoly power over clients, when
agents have a great discretion, and when accountability of the agents to the
principal is weak”. In different terms,
corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability (Klitgaard, 1988:75). Other authors view corruption as “a meeting
of opportunity and inclination”, where the opportunity for corruption depends
on the size of the public rents available, the power that the public officer
has in bargaining with the private interest, the level of accountability, and
the risk involved in the corrupt practice (Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope,
2000: 54). The causes of corruption are many
and vary greatly from country to country, but are generally linked to
ineffective government institutions, poor management practices, a high degree
of political and bureaucratic monopoly power, and also to bureaucratic
traditions that support relationships between the public sector and the
citizens such as clientelism or patronage.
In many developing and transitional countries, there is a dual system of
formal rules that punish corruption, and an informal system where corruption is
accepted as a normal practice. In such
cases, accountability is usually weak, there is no transparency in public
decisions, and public service ethics are eroded (World Bank, 1997). The impact of corruption in the
economic and social development of countries has been analysed and researched
by many scholars, including Paulo Mauro (1998), who not only points to the
negative consequences of corruption on economic growth, but also to the
resulting lack of investment in education and human capital that occurs in
highly corrupt countries. Authors, such
as Ades and di Tella (1995), and Doig and Riley (1998), confirm with empirical studies, that a high
degree of corruption leads to political instability, massive human and capital
flight, and a general deterioration of social and economic conditions. Corruption also seems to be more
pervasive and have a deeper negative impact in developing countries. As Peter Eigen, Chairman of Transparency
International (TI), stated in the launching of the 2001 Corruption Perception
Index (CPI), “the world's poorest are the greatest victims of
corruption". The 2001 CPI measures
the perception of corruption in 91 countries, utilizing surveys from seven independent
institutions and reflecting the opinion of business people, academics and
country analysts. Countries are ranked
from a top score of ten, reflecting a low perception of corruption, to a low
score of one or below, suggesting an extreme level of corruption. According to TI’s assessment, fifty-five
countries, many of which are among the world's poorest, scored less than
five. Additionally, the eight countries
perceived as the most corrupt, scoring less than two, are all developing or
transitional countries. (See Annex 1
CPI index 2001 ) This perception is supported by
authors such as Montinola and Jackman (2002) who examine government corruption
in a cross-section of countries, concluding that low- income countries, which
tend to underpay public sector employees, are more susceptible to corruption.
Corruption in developing countries has a perverse effect, deepening poverty,
increasing social and economic inequality, and preventing governments from
providing essential public services.
The costs of corrupt practices in developing countries can be
categorized into three main areas: economic costs, institutional costs and
social costs. 1.1 Economic
Costs The public sector is a most powerful
actor, as it controls and manages the distribution of a country’s resources and
wealth. Corruption in this management
of resources can be present in the demand and the supply side of this
monopoly. The demand side stems from
public sector employees misusing their power and influence for their private
gain, and the supply side refers to the private sector utilizing bribes to win
public sector contracts or receive preferential treatment. According to the World Bank, bribes
are one of the main tools of corruption (World Bank, 1997). Bribery can influence the government’s
decision to allocate benefits, assign contracts, lower taxes or other fees
collected by the government, issue licenses, speed up the time of bureaucratic
processes, or change the outcome of legal procedures. The economic effects of bribery and corruption have many
dimensions, and have been researched from a viewpoint of short-term and
long-term efficiency, and the long-term growth and development of a
nation. Although some literature suggests
that from a theoretical perspective, bribes may in the short term enhance
efficiency, by circumventing long and cumbersome legalities and cutting red
tape in bureaucratic procedures (Lui, 1985), authors such as Bardham 1997, and
Rose-Ackerman 1999, argue that corrupt markets are much less efficient than
legal markets, as the illegality of transactions, and the presence of bribes,
may discourage the most efficient participants from entering into the market,
creating a false efficiency, where the willingness to pay a higher bribe is
rewarded, rather than the capacity to provide the best product or service. In the long term, these expectations
of bribery completely distort the manner in which benefits are allocated,
creating an informal system where nothing works if ‘hands are not greased’, and
that encourages citizens to break the law.
This not only creates additional costs but also brings losses to the
state, as citizens and companies evade taxes, refusing to pay into a corrupt
government system that is perceived to be squandering the resources it
receives, and where doing business is risky and unpredictable. In terms of the effects on long-term
economic growth and development of a nation,
corruption has been shown to significantly reduce private national and
direct foreign investment, and to slow economic growth (Mauro, 1995). Corruption has a negative effect on investment because a highly
corrupt country is perceived to be high risk, and investors prefer to minimize
risks when considering places where to invest, leading to capital flight as
national investors seek certainty for their business arrangements, and foreign
investors prefer less risky markets.
1.2 Institutional
costs Corruption has a direct impact on
the legitimacy of a government. When the power of the state is misused for
political or personal gain, it engenders mistrust and discontent in the
political and bureaucratic machinery.
In patrimonial states, for example, bureaucratic and political leaders
monopolise power and resources, creating a political system to “maximise the
rent-extraction possibilities”, effectively robbing the state and its citizens
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The social
groups excluded from the patronage of the state may show their dissatisfaction
or frustration with the system outside of the democratic election process,
adding to the country’s political instability, and increasing the possibility
of internal conflict and violence. In highly corrupt governments,
political power is used to buy elections, weakening democracy and making the
state a tool for the reward of supporters, and for the persecution of political
opponents. In clientelistic states,
political and bureaucratic leaders turn over the management of state resources
to allies, who, in practice, dominate and control policymaking, using their
power to achieve favourable legislation or policies. As Rose-Ackerman, 1999, argues, in these clientelistic states
there is the danger that a corrupt police force, justice system, or political
class collude with organised criminal groups to carry out illegal activities,
infiltrating legal businesses as well.
The domination that these organised criminal groups can exert over legal
businesses and the government is extremely dangerous, creating an atmosphere of
lawlessness, uncertainty and violence that threatens to undermine the very
existence of the nation. Authors who have researched the
effects of corruption on the state, (Wade,1983; Williams,1987; Hutchcroft,
1997) argue that corruption weakens government institutions, alienates citizens by making them cynical
about the political process, and leads to their withdrawal from the political
system, in many cases increasing the inequality existent in the system. In developing countries, where government
institutions are often ineffective, policymaking is not transparent, civil
society is not well organised, and bureaucracies are not accountable,
corruption has a devastating effect on the legitimacy of the state, creating
political instability that in many cases results in the toppling of
governments, and in others, in the establishment of dictatorships. Even in countries with a strong
democratic tradition, corruption erodes the effectiveness of government
institutions because it creates inefficiency within these organisations, and
poor management practices that affect the capacity of the agencies to perform
their functions. Lack of resources
breeds dissatisfied civil servants that often work for low wages and receive no
incentives, leading them to rent-seeking activities in order to supplement
their low income, and to the loss of the best-qualified personnel who are
attracted by the private sector (Larbi, 2001).
Corruption
is seen by organisations like the OECD not as a cause but as a symptom of
systemic organisational failure, which thrives when government institutions are
ineffective, laws are not enforced, and in general poor governance is the norm
(OECD, 2000). Corruption is the
antithesis of good governance, because key elements of good governance, such as
high standards of transparency, accountability and public sector ethics, are
not present in a corrupt system. Corruption also becomes an obstacle to the
implementation of reforms that seek to establish good governance principles, as
entrenched interests in the civil service and in society try to derail the
reform efforts that threaten to end their privileged positions. Finally, the resulting lack of public
confidence in bureaucratic organisations and in political leaders, also becomes
an obstacle to the attainment of good governance, as civil society withdraws
from the public arena, resulting in a lack of pressure for reform that allows
government institutions to continue operating in the same manner. 1.3 Social
costs It is commonly assumed that the
state has a responsibility to protect the weakest and most vulnerable groups in
society: children, the elderly, the poor, making policies and carrying out
social programs geared at increasing their welfare. The waste of resources resulting from corruption in government
activities has a severe negative impact on these social programs, which are
usually the first to be cut when resources are scarce, leaving these vulnerable
groups unprotected, and increasing their risk of falling into extreme poverty
levels. Even if there are resources
available, in corrupt regimes, these are usually re-directed to more
politically motivated expenditure, such as infrastructure development (Tanzi
and Davoodi, 1997) rather than to education and social welfare programs that
tend to have less opportunities for corrupt practices (Mauro, 1998). This can be clearly seen in many developing
countries, where there are multimillion-dollar roads and bridges leading to
communities that do not have a clean water source, a proper school, or
automobiles to use the new highways, and that gradually deteriorate without
maintenance. A lack of investment in
education and human capital, results in a nation without a qualified work
force, unprepared for the competitive environment of current globalised
economies. Corrupt governments, where patronage
and personal preferences dictate government policies, are also subjected to
deep divisions within society into regional, ethnic, social and economic
groups, where the struggle for power can lead to the confrontation of these
groups outside of the law. In this
scenario, the less powerful members are systematically cast aside from all
policymaking, increasing the inequality existent in the society, and
re-enforcing a culture of what authors such as Husted call “power distance”, or
an acceptability of the unequal distribution of power that gives special
privileges and benefits to the political class (Husted, 2002). Pervasive and institutionalised
corruption has a demoralising effect on citizens, who perceive the state as a
‘black hole’ that swallows all the resources it receives, and where nothing can
be done to change or improve the situation.
The notion of citizenship as a right and a responsibility is
eroded, re-enforcing the predominance
of personal interests over the well-being and goals of society. Institutionalised corruption
engenders a culture of illegality in every aspect of public life. Even when
government agencies are not engaged in corrupt practices, the perception that
the entire system is corrupt results in suspicion and lack of respect for
public authorities. By discrediting all public sector efforts, this perception
can also undermine legitimate opportunities to institute reforms. In highly corrupt systems, the tolerance for
consistent law breaking erodes the rule of law and leads to a loss of
confidence in the legal system, resulting in citizens taking the law into their
own hands. Additionally, endemic corruption in
the public sphere leads to what Williams and Doig call the “failure to lead by
example”, where citizens perceive that if bureaucrats and politicians are
corrupt, there is little reason why they too should not act in a corrupt manner
(Williams and Doig, 2000). This
‘legalisation’ of corruption in both the public and private sectors is truly
the most dangerous enemy of a nation’s development and progress. Chapter 2 - Initiatives
to control corruption Controlling corruption is as complex an issue
as corruption itself, and some authors such as Robert Williams believe that
“eliminating corruption completely from public life is an impossible
dream.”(Williams and Theobald, 2000: x). Corruption takes on different forms in
every country. However, there is some consensus among academics and
policymakers that corrupt activities need to be attacked on several fronts,
taking a systematic approach that prevents corruption from occurring in the
first place, by making it a “high risk and low return undertaking” (Lanseth,
Stapenhurst and Pope, 2000: 61). Anti-corruption strategies are proposed and
supported at the international, regional, national and local levels. Although we are concerned mostly with the
application of anti-corruption initiatives at the national level, it is
important to point out that many of these mechanisms are supported by
international agencies such as the World Bank, OECD, UNDP, Transparency International,
and by regional development agencies in Europe, Asia, Latin America and
Africa. There are two prominent models of controlling
corruption that have come out of these international organisations: the World
Bank and Transparency International’s (TI) “National Integrity System” and the
OECD’s “Ethics Infrastructure”. Both
mechanisms advocate the need for a holist approach that promotes public sector
ethics with the support and participation of the private sector and civil
society, highlighting eight main elements in the fight against corruption. These mechanisms have been used here to
identify five areas of anti-corruption initiatives: public sector reforms,
anti-corruption legislation, economic liberalisation policies, civil
society participation and the role of the private sector, and watchdog
instruments, such as anti-corruption agencies.
Since the latter strategy is the subject of the next chapter, here we
briefly focus on the other four mechanisms and their main components. Table 1: Summary of
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Bank, Transparency
International and OECD. 2.1
Public
Sector Reforms Public Sector reforms to tackle corruption necessarily include programs
to strengthen public institutions and the creation public sector control,
guidance and management mechanisms that prevent or minimise the opportunities
for corrupt activities (OECD, 1996).
Reform initiatives vary from country to country, but in general, can be
characterised into two main areas: civil service reform and financial
management/budget reform. Underlining
these strategies is the political will, leadership and commitment to carry them
out, which is a fundamental requirement for these reforms to be
successful. 2.1.1
Civil
Service reform. One of the major goals of civil service reform programs is the need to
build a professional civil service with an ethos of public service and high
standards of behaviour. It is
recognised that a well-trained, well-paid and professional civil service is the
basis for effective public institutions.
Reform initiatives therefore include the establishment of clear ethical
codes of conduct that are enforced by civil service regulations and
civil/criminal law. These codes of
conduct should promote accountability and transparency by requiring the
declaration of assets and income of public sector managers, limiting the types
of ‘gifts’ public officers can receive, and regulating the potential conflicts
of interest in the public service. Acknowledging that in many developing countries public sector salaries
are inadequate, and that this leads to pressure to engage in corrupt
activities, reforms also include improvements to the remuneration of civil
servants, establishing fair salary structures and motivating productivity and
efficiency through merit-based promotion and other incentives. Additionally, establishing training programs
geared at institutionalising codes of
conduct and ethical standards are included, along with mechanisms to protect
civil servants from political interference (World Bank, 1997). Other civil service reform initiatives include organisational
restructuring such as separating the operational from the policy arms of
institutions, incorporating performance management, streamlining work processes,
simplifying bureaucratic procedures, increasing the efficacy of reporting
mechanisms, instituting periodical reviews of targets, and reformulating and
redesigning public policies and programs to eliminate those that serve no
purpose and are riddled with corruption.
Eliminating or reducing the monopoly power of bureaucratic institutions
is another reform that tackles the potential for abuse when there is too much
discretionary power and little accountability
(Williams and Doig, 2000). A number of countries have instituted civil service reforms such as
those mentioned above, not only to uncover corrupt activities but also to
prevent them. Among them, for example,
Poland, Korea and Japan have instituted human resources management controls,
such as standardised recruitment policies and disciplinary sanctions for breach
of ethic codes across the civil service, while Spain, Hungary and Mexico have
established processes for detecting and preventing the conflicts of interest of
public sector employees (OECD,
1999). The governments of Uganda,
Tanzania, Ethiopia and Ghana have also begun a series of civil service reform
programs, with the support of the World Bank, to establish codes of conduct and
public service standards, provide leadership training for public servants, and
monitor their declaration of assets to prevent conflicts of interest (Larbi, 2001). In the area of salary improvements, one of the most successful examples
is the case of Singapore, where a strategy of gradual pay rises accompanied by
strict penalties for fraudulent activities has led to a public service that is
considered among the most effective and productive in the world, and where
public sector employees are well recognised and highly regarded (Quah, 1999). Another strategy has been followed by the government of Uganda,
where the non-monetary benefits of civil servants are being monetarised in
order to make their benefits package more real and visible, in the hope that
this will highlight the advantages of being a civil servant and the risk of
losing the job because of unethical behaviour
(Pope, 2000). 2.1.2 Financial Management/ Budget reform
Lack of transparency in the management of state resources, in budgetary
processes and resources allocation, facilitates the possibility for corrupt
activities. Therefore, reforms in this
area are geared at improving financial management systems to serve as tools for
preventing, discovering and punishing fraudulent operations (World Bank, 1997).
A key reform initiative entails making the budget a real, open and
transparent process, where resources are allocated according to the
government’s priority policies, programs and targets, and not as the ‘wish
lists’ of its political supporters.
Effective financial management systems place clear responsibilities for
managing resources, and facilitate the audit of expenditures, reducing the
opportunities for the unofficial use of resources. Internal financial
management controls and external auditing have been implemented successfully in
OECD countries such as Poland, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, and Korea, and
in Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Ecuador among developing countries (OECD, 1999;
TI, 2000). Financial reforms are also used
to strengthen key institutions such as tax and revenue departments, customs
agencies and other government departments that are often susceptible to fraud
and corruption (World Bank, 1997). For
example, Mexico introduced reforms in the tax and customs service in an attempt
to reduce corruption and tax evasion, and additionally raise revenues for the
state. Although some of these reforms
were difficult to implement, their success has been recognised by both
government officials and the business sector
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Another reform scheme includes improving government procurement
procedures, an area that is especially vulnerable to corrupt practices. In developing countries, government institutions often lack the capacity to manage
contracts and the procurement of goods/services, making the development of a
code of standardised procurement rules and regulations a key initiative. The consolidation and standardisation of
multiple government agency rules into a single public sector procurement code
can help to carry out procurement decisions in an efficient, fair, impartial,
transparent and accountable manner, and can also facilitate the detection and
punishment of corrupt actions (Williams and Doig, 2000). The United States has been particularly
successful in instituting procurement reform, some aspects of which have been
adopted by Japan and Korea, resulting in the dismantling of a cartel of
contractors that regularly colluded to fix prices and tender offers (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 2.2 Judicial reform and anti-corruption
legislation An effective legal system is crucial for the fight against corruption,
just as an ineffective or politicised
judiciary is the best friend of corruption.
The first step in a judicial reform process is a review of the country’s
legal framework, to uncover weaknesses and inconsistencies in the laws, as well
as out-dated legislation that should be removed from the civil and criminal
codes. Other reforms include
strengthening the independence of the courts by changing the system of
appointments/removal of judges, improving procedures and the administration of
cases, giving the citizens better access to the justice system through
alternative mechanisms, and countering corruption of court staff by
establishing fair pay scales and judicial ethics training (World Bank, 1997). Where the judicial system is honest and respected, it can counter the
activities of a corrupt government, as in the case of Brazil, where former
President Collor de Mello was impeached by Congress and the process upheld and
monitored by the Supreme Court, leading to his dismissal from office (Geddes
and Ribeiro Neto, 1999). In Italy and
in Spain, the independence of judges and magistrates has been central to the
recent anti-corruption prosecutions and investigations, although the people
involved in the scandals were powerful business and government officials
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Accountability of the judicial system to the public and to the
government is essential in tackling corruption within the courts. Those responsible for the investigation,
prosecution and management of corruption cases must have the highest moral
standards and be subjected to periodical review of their work, as well as
having clear accountability mechanisms to superiors and an adequate system to
address complaints. Where there is widespread
corruption in the legal system, judicial misconduct can be investigated by a
special prosecutor’s office or by a commission of enquiry set up specifically
for this purpose (Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope, 2000). The fight against corruption requires specific anti-corruption
legislation that defines public standards of behaviour and enforces them
through investigation and prosecution (OECD, 2000). Anti-corruption legislation should work with the existing civil
service rules, regulations and codes of conduct by clarifying and increasing
the effectiveness of these legal instruments.
In OECD countries such as Belgium, France, Hungary and Italy, for example, bribery is typified as a criminal
offence, while in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Mexico, there is
additional anti-corruption legislation that prohibits illicit enrichment,
making false statements to mislead officials and interfering with public
processes, including procurement bids.
While most countries have regulations and other secondary legislation
that impose restrictions and sanctions on corrupt activities, Japan and Korea among OECD countries have
unique legislation that sanctions actions such as “deserting public office and
causing a discredit to the public service”
(OECD, 1999: 15). Regardless of how well-written and well-intentioned anti-corruption laws
are, they are completely ineffective without enforcement, making it is
essential that civil and criminal laws are used consistently to enforce and
penalise corrupt activities. The
experience of many developing countries, including Nigeria, suggests that the
main weakness of legal reforms and instruments in combating corruption is that
they ultimately depend on the will and perseverance of political leaders
(Theobald, 1990). Where political power
is used to shield corrupt activities of family, friends or political
supporters, no laws, codes or punishments will have an impact on corruption. 2.3 Economic
liberalisation policies For many developing countries, economic reform is a strategic component
of anti-corruption strategies, in particular for transitional countries, where
the state had a complete monopoly over the means of production, such as the
post-Soviet states. In these countries,
as well as in others with a one party system, or long-standing ruling parties,
such as Mexico, Italy and Japan, both substantial state intervention in the
economy, and weak political competition have facilitated systemic
corruption (Morris, 1991; Heywood,
1997). Economic liberalisation policies include the privatisation of state
assets, deregulation and the expansion of competition in the markets. These economic reforms are supported by
public choice theory[1]
and a neo-liberal economic model, that views corruption as product of the
distortion of the market by the actions of a monopolistic force, the
government. In order to reduce
corruption, it is therefore necessary to reduce this monopoly and let the
market act to promote competition and reduce the opportunities and incentives
for corrupt actions (Williams and
Theobald, 2000). 2.3.1 Privatisation Privatisation of state assets involves the sale and transfer of these
assets to the private sector. By
reducing the discretion of public managers and transferring the responsibility
to the private sector, privatisation increases competition and transparency,
key ingredients in the fight against corruption (World Bank, 1997). Privatisation should be part of a state
reform process that advocates a smaller and more efficient public sector, one that
should concentrate its efforts in the areas where, because of the imperfections
of the market, it must continue to be involved in order to guarantee fairness
and equity in the access of the citizens to basic public goods and services. In competitive markets and areas such as telecommunications, energy
generation and infrastructure development, privatisation of state assets, in
the long run, produces benefits that are indisputable, including better
products and services, wider availability of these services, reduced costs to
the state and the consumers, and additional income to the government that
should allow it to invest in priority areas and programs. In the short term, however, privatisation
efforts can bring additional opportunities for corruption, if, for example,
state assets are sold off in processes that are not as transparent and
competitive as they ought to be, resulting in what Williams calls the “licensed
theft of state property” (Williams, 2000: xii). Additionally, if the transfer does no more than replace a public
monopoly with a private one, and citizens continue to lack access to reliable
and effective services, then the change of ownership is irrelevant, and
probably more detrimental to the welfare of the consumers than if the assets had
stayed in public hands. In many cases, the corruption that is present in privatisation
processes, similar to the corruption present in the contracting of goods and
services, is a direct result of the lack of capacity of the institutions
managing the processes. It is therefore
necessary that these institutions are strengthened, that their negotiation and
management skills are developed, and that an appropriate regulatory framework
for the privatised sector is established prior to the transfer, with a strong
and independent regulatory authority at the forefront of the process. The opportunities for rent-seeking and favouritisms in the privatisation
process can be minimised by actively encouraging the participation of the best
possible providers, making the process publicly known and information widely
available. A transparent and credible
privatisation process, with clear rules, regulations and a solid legal
framework, reduces the opportunities for corruption before, during and after
the transfer, and should be the goal of governments wishing to use the
privatisation of state assets as a tool to increase competition and minimise
corruption. 2.3.2 Deregulation and the
expansion of competition Deregulation, or the removal of ‘artificial’ impediments to free
competition is usually considered alongside privatisation and the expansion of
competition in an effort to use market forces to regulate the production,
distribution and pricing of goods and services, rather than the monopolistic
control of the government (Theobald,
1990). Macro and micro-economic
policies that encourage the strengthening of markets and free competition
restrict the possibility of rent-seeking and the bribing of public officials. Deregulation entails the lowering or elimination of import restrictions
and other barriers to trade, eliminating exchange rate controls, licensing
systems, marketing boards, and other systems of monopoly distribution and
import/export control, eliminating price controls, cutting subsidies to public
and private companies, and reducing burdensome regulations and other barriers
to market entry for new firms. Some of these reforms are fairly easy to
implement and can produce visible results in little time, creating a system
where the state supports rather than governs markets (World Bank, 1997). Another type of competition that can be used as a deterrent to corrupt
activities is competition within the public service. Competitive bureaucracy, as advocated by authors such as
Rose-Ackerman, involves a strategy whereby public officials can provide equal
services to consumers, and these in turn have the choice to purchase these
services or goods from a variety of sources.
This can be applied, for example, to postal services, passports and
documents, and other public benefits available to all consumers. When this is the case, discretion is
reduced, and if an officer solicits a bribe, the consumer can easily go to
another officer for the same service, lowering the possibility for illegal
activities, and increasing the risk to the officer of being caught and losing
his/her post. For competitive
bureaucracy to work, three conditions need to exist: first, that all citizens
be entitled to the benefit; second, that officers do not have the discretion to
give away more benefits than requested; and third, that bureaucratic
hierarchies can easily monitor the activities of their officers and hold them
accountable for the revenue collected (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 2.3 Civil
society participation and the role of the private sector It is commonly accepted that any successful
anti-corruption strategy requires the active participation of civil society:
organised groups of citizens, non-governmental associations, religious
organisations, the media and the private sector. Public support for anti-corruption initiatives is crucial. This is the reason why it is necessary to
devise strategies to increase awareness of the costs and consequences of
corruption, not only at the macro level of the state, but also what corruption
means to the citizens, and to companies on a daily basis. Strategies aimed at changing the perception of
corruption as a ‘necessary evil’ are required where systemic corruption is
present and citizens are accustomed to paying bribes as a normal
occurrence. These, have included: informative programs that highlight the
citizen’s rights to public services and benefits, and also their duty to
complain and report corrupt behaviour in their dealings with public servants. In Tanzania, for example, a survey to
understand the perceptions of the public about corruption, and also the civil
servants’ idea of what corrupt behaviour entailed, helped to devise campaigns
to change perceptions, combat citizen’s apathy, and understand what prevents
citizens and public officers from reporting corrupt behaviour (Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope, 2000). The media has a specific responsibility in
informing citizens, reporting corrupt practices or the success of
anti-corruption probes. The work of the
press can be very effective in exposing corruption, as they are particularly
well placed, have the investigative power and control the means of distributing
the information widely, turning issues into public scandals, and generating a
sense of outrage and the need to take action on the part of citizens and also
of the government (Perry, 1997).
Regional media organisations, such as PROBIDAD[2],
a network of journalists who promote free press in the fight against corruption
in Latin America, have been particularly successful in publicising news about
corruption in the region, and are part of a new wave of journalists that
contribute to the fight against corruption by increasing the awareness of its
pervasiveness and its consequences. Reports
of the government’s ‘moral crisis’ can produce reforms. However, they can also
result in individualized purges that distract attention from the real
organisational issues that permit corruption.
It is therefore important that corruption scandals be used to attack,
not only the individuals who are guilty, but also the underlying causes and
incentives. Additionally, the danger of
corruption scandals and subsequent purges is that a corrupt government may use
them to discredit and remove political opponents, put up a false “political
show” of fighting corruption, and in the process, destroy the legitimacy and
credibility of the media as a tool to expose real issues (Theobald, 1990: 139). The private sector is also an important
participant in any anti-corruption strategy, as it is both a victim and an
accomplice in public sector corrupt practices.
Companies that carry out illegal practices in order to do business with
corrupt governments, incur great costs that outweigh the compensation they
receive. It is important to highlight
these costs, and the advantages of operating in a legal environment with
judicial security and clear rules for competition. The private sector should be part of a
coalition of civil society groups, media organisations and reformers within the
government to push for policies that promote integrity in the dealings with the
public sector. Such coalitions already
exist in countries like Ecuador, Colombia and Morocco, where business
associations support and participate in government anti-corruption campaigns,
helping to disseminate policies and making their employees aware of corrupt
practices and how to counter them (OECD, 2000). Additionally, the private sector can use its resources to help
combat corruption, as part of the company’s commitment to social responsibility,
and participate with civil society organisations and the media to help monitor,
expose and denounce corrupt activities of both public institutions and private
organisations (Irene Hors, 2000). Corruption in the public sector does not happen within a vacuum, and in
order to fight it, there must be a concerted effort by all parties involved in
one way or another: the government,
civil society, the media and the private business sector. The anti-corruption strategies at the
national and international level, although fairly new, are already beginning to
bear fruit, with coalitions of businesses, citizens and governments working
together to promote ethics, transparency and a culture of rejection of corrupt
behaviour. Chapter 3 - Comparative typology of
anti-corruption agencies A key component in the World Bank/ TI
National Integrity System and
the OECD’s Ethics Infrastructure is the establishment of anti-corruption bodies
and other watchdog mechanisms in an effort to monitor, investigate, deter and
punish corrupt behaviour.
These bodies include: Ombudsman
Office, Supreme Audit Institutions and Anti-Corruption agencies. Since the main focus of this Chapter is the
role of anti-corruption agencies, using the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore,
Botswana and Ecuador, the discussion of the other watchdog mechanisms is
limited to a brief analysis of their characteristics. The office of Ombudsman, called by
many names in different countries, is specifically set up to receive complaints
from the public regarding the administration and work of public sector
institutions. Once a complaint is
received, the office investigates the allegations and determines if there is
indeed a practice that is illegal, or if the action taken by the public
officials is fraught with inefficiency or mal-administration. The scope of action of the office varies
from country to country. In some cases they have prosecutorial capacity, while
in others their action is limited to passing the information to the appropriate
sanctioning body, the police or judiciary.
The office can also recommend changes in policies and procedures, thus
aiding in the prevention of corrupt practices. Supreme Audit Institutions include
the Auditor General, National Comptroller and other government bodies
responsible for the internal financial management and auditing of government
expenses and revenues. These
institutions are key in guarding the transparent, accountable and efficient use
of financial resources, assuring the legality and integrity of financial
transactions, and providing key information on the government’s management of
its resources. In cases of
mal-administration or corruption, these institutions, depending on their
statutory functions, can refer the cases to the appropriate authorities for
further investigation and punishment if the case requires it. For both the Ombudsman and Supreme Audit
Institutions to be effective in their work, they require independence of
action, adequate budgeting for their activities, freedom to manage their resources
and their staff, and especially protection from the pressures that other
agencies, political parties and civil servants may exert upon them (TI, 2000). In many developing countries, the
need to find alternative mechanisms to the conventional law enforcement
agencies that may be over-extended in their capacity or may themselves be part
of a corrupt system, has resulted in the creation of anti-corruption agencies
as specialised bodies to spearhead anti-corruption strategies. These agencies have been created as the
enforcement bodies of anti-corruption legislation, with specific powers to
detect and deter corruption. The
particular scope of action of these agencies varies from country to country,
but in general, these agencies have the authority to receive, investigate and
detect corrupt activity, and some have prosecutorial powers. Additionally,
anti-corruption agencies are usually responsible for creating awareness
campaigns, and mobilising and educating citizens about public sector ethics and
corruption. The
discussion on the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies has spurred quite a
debate among academics and government reformers (Doig, 1995;Quah, 1999; Pope
1999; TI, 2000). What then, are the
characteristics of anti-corruption agencies that have proven to be successful
in their fight against corruption, and conversely, what characteristics make
the work of anti-corruption agencies difficult? Four agencies: Hong
Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Singapore’s Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), Botswana’s Directorate of Corruption and
Economic Crime (DCEC) and Ecuador’s Civic Commission to Control Corruption
(CCCC) were examined in order to answer this question. For each of these agencies, we looked at
various characteristics: what
conditions gave rise to their creation, their legal framework, scope of
action, staffing, budget, degree of independence, internal structure, and
community relations. The characteristics of
each agency are summarised in Table 2. Table 2 Anti-Corruption agencies: Summary of Findings
3.1
Hong Kong: Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) ICAC is often cited as an example of a successful anti-corruption
agency, and has been used as a model for the establishment of agencies in both
developed and developing countries.
ICAC’s strategy has proven effective because of a combination of factors
including its legal framework, budget and staffing capacity, and the work of
the commission in both prevention and prosecution (Pope, 2000). 3.1.1 Legal Framework ICAC was created by statute enacted
by the Legislative Council in 1974 and given the prime responsibility of
fighting corruption in Hong Kong and restoring public confidence in the
government. Its creation came at a time
when the public service was regarded as highly corrupt, including the police.
Several high-level corruption scandals erupted and there was massive public
outcry for action. Essential to the
work of ICAC is the legal framework within which it operates: the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO)
enacted in 1971, and amendments made to the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance
(POCO), and Corrupt and Illegal Practices Ordinance (CIPO) to make these legal
instruments stronger, clearer and more effective. 3.1.2 Scope of Action At its creation ICAC was given a
three-pronged strategy: to investigate
allegations of corruption, to prevent corruption by the improvement of public
sector procedures and systems, and to educate the public about corruption and
secure their support in the fight against it
(ICAC, 2002). Additionally,
ICAC’s operational arms were
given the backing and support of the highest governmental authorities in order
to, not only investigate all public officials without regards to their
position, but also to pursue corruption in the private sector. ICAC however, cannot prosecute
suspects. This is the responsibility of
the country’s Secretary for Justice, a prosecutorial restriction that is
maintained as a safeguard against the possible misuse of power by the
commission. It is the Commissioner’s
responsibility to present the evidence to the Secretary for Justice so he/she
can decide whether or not to proceed with a criminal prosecution (De Speville,
1997; ICAC, 2002). 3.1.3
Independence and accountability ICAC was specifically designed as an
independent agency, separate from the police force and other crime prosecution
units, with the head of the organisation, the Commissioner, responsible
directly to the country’s Governor (Chief Executive after 1997). The commission was given the resources and
manpower necessary to fund and perform its operations, and provided with
independence of action as reflected by: ·
the
Commissioner’s responsibilities ·
freedom
from the direction or control of any organisation or person, ·
accountability
directly to the Chief Executive, Executive Council, Legislative Council and to
five citizen committees ·
freedom
in the management of staff and resources, ·
total access
to vital information, ·
the
ability to investigate the highest levels of public authority, ·
the
powers of search, seizure of assets and arrest of suspects conferred to the
officers of the commission. (Quah, 1999; De Speville, 1997;
Quah, 2001; ICAC, 2002) 3.1.4 Staffing and Budget ICAC’s success is also derived from
the ability of the Commission to employ professional, qualified and
unquestionably honest staff.
Appointments are made for a fixed 2-3 year period, and the officer’s
background, including potential conflicts of interest are scrutinised
carefully. Officers are restricted from
political activity and the highest standards of conduct and discipline are
expected. Dismissal need not be
justified on the grounds of conduct, as a loss of confidence in the integrity
of the officer is enough to remove him/her from the post. In 2002, ICAC has 1,314 officers, of whom over 800 are in the
Operations Department, and whose salaries amount to the largest percentage of
the budget of USD$94 million that ICAC managed in the fiscal year 2001-2002[3] (De
Speville, 1997; ICAC, 2002). 3.1.4
Community
participation From the onset, ICAC sought the
public’s involvement and support to conduct its activities. It carried out educative and awareness
campaigns with the support of community educators, convincing citizens of the
need to report and denounce corrupt activities, monitoring public perceptions
on corruption, and using the media to publicise the achievements of the
organisation. In addition, citizens play a vital role in monitoring the
commission’s actions, as four
committees comprised of prominent community members scrutinise the activities
of the each of the Commission’s departments and provide advise to the
Commissioner, while the ICAC Complaints Committee handles all public complaints
made against the Commission and its officers. (Quah,
1999; De Speville, 1997). It is ICAC’s three-pronged strategy
that has merited the attention of other countries, which have tried to copy it
and apply it to their own circumstances, specifically, the recognition that
prosecution of corruption cannot work separately from a campaign to educate the
public and change public perceptions on the dangers of corruption. The
successful work of ICAC in controlling a deeply rooted, systemic corruption
problem, is recognised to stem from its independence of action and strong legal
powers. Apart from its effectiveness in curbing corruption, ICAC’s special
success lies in the change of public attitudes that has occurred in the Hong
Kong community, from a widespread tolerance of corrupt activities to the
public’s outright rejection of corruption. (De Speville, 1997). 3.2
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) Singapore’s CPIB is the oldest
anti-corruption agency in the Asia-Pacific region, established in 1952 to
enforce Singapore’s anti-corruption legislation (Prevention of Corruption Act,
POCA). The CIPB has been successful in its fight against
corruption due to three fundamental factors:
(CPIB, 2002; Quah, 2001) 3.2.1 Legal Framework The extensive enforcement powers of
CPIB stem from amendments to the 1937 Prevention of Corruption Ordinance
(POCO), that became in 1960 the Prevention of Corruption Act, POCA. POCA increased the scope of action of CPIB,
strengthened the provisions against bribery by focusing on reducing both the
opportunities and incentives for corruption, and increased the penalties for
those found guilty. Currently, any
person found guilty of corrupt activities under POCA’s definition can be
sentenced to five years imprisonment and/or fined US $100,000. [4] In 1989,
the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act empowered the court to freeze and
confiscate properties and assets obtained by corrupt offenders pursued by
CPIB, which can then use these assets to recover the amount of bribes received
and the costs to the state of prosecuting the case. In 1999,
the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act gave CPIB further
powers and responsibilities for the investigation and prosecution of
drug-related crimes and money laundering (CPIB, 2002). 3.2.2 Scope of Action CPIB is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the public service,
and encouraging the private sector to conduct its activities in a
corruption-free environment. The bureau is also responsible for investigating
corrupt practices by public officers and reporting such cases to the
appropriate government departments and public bodies for disciplinary action.
Although the primary function of CPIB is to investigate public sector
corruption, it is also empowered to investigate any offence that is disclosed
in the course of a corruption investigation (CPIB, 2002). 3.2.3
Independence
and Accountability Although CPIB is located
in the Prime Minister’s Office, it is independent
in its structure, personnel, finance and power. The Director of CPIB is directly accountable to the Prime
Minister and to the Legislature, and if required must also present reports to
the elected President. As a
counter-weight to its investigative powers, the CPIB cannot pursue the
prosecution of a suspect on its own.
The Director of the bureau is responsible for presenting the evidence to
the Attorney General who decides whether or not to prosecute a case. The Director must also seek the consent of
the Prime Minister or the President to investigate high-level officials, such
as Ministers (Quah, 1999;CPIB, 2002). CPIB is considered by authors such
as Quah, 1999, as even more effective that Hong Kong’s ICAC, due to its small
size and position within the Prime Ministers Office, which gives it access to
essential information for its investigations, guarantees the cooperation of
ministries and other public agencies, and also gives the bureau political clout
and power to reach the highest levels of both public and private sector
organisations. 3.2.4
Staffing and Budget Compared to Hong Kong’s
ICAC, CPIB is a small agency, with 71 officers working in its departments
(Quah, 1999). CPIB
staff is chosen with the highest professional standards, and they adhere to
strict codes of conduct with regards to the nature and confidentiality of their
work, which must be carried out with total integrity, impartiality and propriety. The bureau stresses the need to achieve
results in an expedient manner, reason why CPIB has stringent service standards
to act on complaints. For example, investigations, depending on the nature of the case,
must be completed in a maximum of three months, and complaints acted upon
within 48 hours, or immediately if the crime is in progress (CPIB, 2002). In 1986, CPIB
had a budget of USD $4.33 million
(Quah, 1999). 3.2.5 Community Participation As one of CPIB’s
anti-corruption strategies, the bureau carries out prevention work directed at
public and private sector employees, stressing the evils of corruption and the
punishment that the law establishes for corrupt activities. The initial lack of public support for
CPIB’s activities stemmed from the scepticism of citizens, and the fear of
reprisals. As the work of the bureau
demonstrated a real commitment to investigate and punish corruption, and public
sector officials were dismissed from offices or resigned, confidence in the
work of the CPIB grew among citizens (CPIB, 2002). CPIB’s work depends on the cooperation and support of the
public, reason why recent incidents where CPIB investigators have been accused
of mistreating suspects in corruption cases, and being ‘over-zealous’ in their
jobs has created tension between the public and the bureau, and threatens to
undermine the credibility and reputation of the organisation (Quah, 2000). 3.3
Botswana’s Directorate of
Corruption and Economic Crime, DCEC The devastating effects of
corruption on economic and social development, and the internal and external
pressures of democratisation, prompted many governments in Africa to look at
anti-corruption agencies as mechanisms to control and prevent corrupt
activities in the public sector. One
such case is Botswana’s Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime, DCEC[5],
established in 1994, and which has had mixed success in its mandate to curb
corruption (Mukum Mbaku, 1996). 3.3.1 Legal Framework The creation of the DCEC followed a
wave of corruption scandals in the 1990s, and the appointment of a series of
Presidential Commissions to investigate these cases. Each, concluded that
politicians and civil servants were using their positions and powers to enrich
themselves illicitly and that the criminal justice system was not being
effective in dealing with these corruption cases. As a response, the Government of Botswana enacted the Corruption
and Crime Act (CEC) of 1994 with the main objectives of: creating the DCEC, setting-up
anti-corruption provisions, and giving the DCEC the power to investigate cases
of corruption and economic crimes against the state, such as tax evasion
(Quansah, 1994). Additionally, the CEC Act established the powers and
duties of the Director, stated the procedures to be followed in handling cases,
and specified the offences involving public officers, employees of public
bodies, agents, and those in the private sector (DCEC, 2002). In 2000, amendments to the Proceeds
of Serious Crimes Act were enacted by the National Assembly, making dealing in
illegally acquired assets a criminal offence, and empowering the DCEC to
investigate suspected money-laundering and related crimes (DCEC Annual Report, 2002). 3.3.2
Scope of Action The
government of Botswana reviewed the approaches taken in other countries,
particularly in Hong Kong, and saw that significant results had been achieved
by implementing a three-pronged approach of: investigation, corruption
prevention and public education, adopting the same mechanisms for the DCEC (DCEC, 2002). The main function of the DCEC is the investigation and
prosecution of people suspected of corrupt activities, and such investigation
can be either initiated by a public complaint, or by the DCEC itself. The agency has very broad discretionary
powers to investigate and obtain information, and under the law any person who
fails to provide the requested information or gives out false information can
be imprisoned for up to five years and /or given a fine of up to USD$2,000 (Manga Fombad,
1999). One of the most effective powers
of the DCEC is the ability to arrest,
search and seize suspects. However, it
cannot prosecute a case unless it has the consent of the Attorney General
(DCEC, 2002). Additionally,
the DCEC is directed by law to assist any government law enforcement agency in
the investigation of crimes against the state revenue. The directorate is able to arrest any person
suspected of having committed or being in the process of committing a crime,
and remit them to the police for questioning, using ‘reasonable’ force. (Quansah,
1994). The DCEC has the mandate to examine
the practices and procedures of public agencies in order to prevent corrupt
practices, and advise public officials and managers of public institutions on
the means to eliminate the potential for corrupt activities. For this purpose, the DCEC created a
specialised body, the Corruption Prevention Group (CPG) whose mission is to
identify areas in public organisations that are particularly susceptible to
corrupt transactions, such as purchasing and tendering, and advise the managers
of these areas on work practices that limit the potential for corruption (DCEC,
2002). 3.3.3
Independence
and Accountability The DCEC
functions as an autonomous directorate under the Office of the President. The President of the
country has exclusive powers to appoint the Director of the DCEC, establish his
tenure and powers as he/she sees fit, effectively limiting the independence of
the agency’s head, and of the agency itself.
In terms of public accountability,
the Director must submit annual reports of the DCEC’s activities to the
President, and no other public or civil society body has the power to
scrutinize the activities of the agency.
Some authors, such as Manga Fombad, 1999, believe that these immense
discretionary powers conferred to the President could be misused by an
autocratic leader, who may use the DCEC as an instrument to attack and
intimidate political opponents, and cover up cases of corruption among
supporters and friends. Because of this concern, the DCEC
has requested the establishment of a Presidential Review Committee to assess
its work and reassure the public that it is not misusing the powers conferred
to it by law (Manga Fombad, 1999). Another limit to the DCEC’s powers
constitutes the inability to
prosecute cases without the consent of the Attorney General. Although prosecution is the responsibility
of the Attorney General, DCEC officers, in their capacity as public prosecutors,
can assist the Attorney General in cases they see fit
(DCEC, 2002). 3.3.4
Staffing
and Budget In 2002,
DCEC had 130 staff members and a budget of USD$1.7 million for
its eight branches of operation (DCEC,
2002). 3.3.5 Community Participation The DCEC uses the media to promote its anti-corruption work,
conducts public awareness and educational campaigns, and publishes and
distributes promotional material on corruption and prevention measures to
encourage public support (DCEC, 2002).
However, there are no formal arrangements that permit the participation of
organised citizen groups or civil society organisations in the work of the
DCEC. Historically,
the citizens of Botswana have been sceptical of the work of the agency, and the
DCEC has been criticised because of its limited effectiveness in curbing
high-level public corruption, as opposed to its efficient work in cutting petty
or low-level corruption. This
perceived ‘double standard’ in prosecuting corruption has been detrimental to
the agency’s public image, casting doubt over the credibility and impartiality
of the agency’s work (Manga
Fombad, 1999). In order to counter
these perceptions, and gauge public knowledge on the agency’s activities, the DCEC carried out public awareness surveys in
2001. These showed that more action was
needed to reach not only urban, but also rural citizens with the agency’s
anti-corruption message. The DCEC now
regularly visits towns and villages to talk to leaders, teachers, school
children and citizens about corruption, anti-corruption mechanisms, and the
work of the DCEC in combating corruption (DCEC Annual Report, 2002). 3.4 Ecuador’s
Civic Commission to Control Corruption (CCCC) According to TI’s 2001 Corruption
Perception Index, Ecuador is ranked among the most corrupt countries in the
world, with a score of 2.3/10, together with Russia and Pakistan. In contrast, the other countries analysed
scored: Hong Kong (7.9/10), Singapore (9.2/10) and Botswana (6.0/10). Needless to say, both grand and petty
corruption in Ecuador are pervasive and institutionalised in both the public
and private sector, and have become an accepted part of daily life for
Ecuadorian citizens. It is not uncommon
and quite disheartening that the same people who have worked to establish
anti-corruption mechanisms have themselves been accused and later prosecuted
for corruption. To name a few, the ex-Vice President Alfredo Dahik, who was
responsible for establishing TI’s Chapter in Ecuador, fled to Costa Rica after
being charged with mal-administration of public funds; Fabian Alarcón, who as interim President
established the CCCC, was jailed for mal-administration when he was President
of the Congress; ex-President Jamil Mahuad, who supported the CCCC, was ousted
from the Presidency in 1999 and ‘faces’ the justice system from the United
States. Unfortunately for this small
country, the list is too numerous to continue.[6] The CCCC is now in its fifth year of
operations, and although it has brought corruption scandals out of the shadows
and into the public light, its work has been limited because of several issues,
including a weak legal mandate and power, lack of political and bureaucratic
support, and limited independence of action. 3.4.1 Legal Framework In February 1997, amidst public
outrage for the level of corruption exhibited by then President Abdala Bucaram
and his government, the President was ousted from power by Congress, who
declared him unfit to rule. The interim
President, Fabian Alarcón, pressured by public opinion, issued an Executive
Decree creating the Civic Commission for the Control of Corruption (CCCC), made
up of ‘honourable’ members of society selected by the President. This agency was originally created to
investigate the activities of the Bucaram government, and was supposed to
finish its work by the end of Alarcon’s period in December, 1997. However, the agency was given a new lease of
life, when in April 1998, the Constituent Assembly that reformed the
Constitution, included the CCCC in Articles 220 and 221 of the new Constitution,
making the fight against corruption a policy of the Ecuadorian state (CCCC, 2002). The work of the Commission in those
first months was difficult, to say the least, as there was no anti-corruption
legislation to support the legal mandate of the CCCC. The Law for the Civic Control of Corruption was passed one year
later, in August 1999 . From its birth,
the CCCC’s actions were curtailed by a lack of legal tools to perform its
duties successfully, and even though it is established as an independent
agency, the powers vested in the commission are limited and weak, making it a
‘muzzled and chained dog’. 3.4.2 Scope of Action The commission, although formally a
government agency, is established as a civil society control mechanism with the
mission of investigating and preventing acts of corruption, primarily in the
public sector, but also at the interface between the public and private
sectors, such as contracting, procurement, and concessions. The commission’s main activity is the
investigation of allegations of corruption.
The results of its investigations must be submitted to:
(Reglamento a la Ley de la CCCC, 2000.) The commission has key areas or
‘corruption niches’ where it focuses a large number of its investigations. These include: procurement procedures,
personnel administration, customs/commercial services, banking and finance
systems, contracts and bidding, and privatisation processes. However, the CCCC does not have any ‘teeth’
to conduct its investigations.
According to its officials, the agency’s most difficult task is
gathering the necessary evidence to support the cases that it pursues. The agency does not have the power to
arrest, search, seize documents or evidence, and most of its investigation work
is done undercover. A large part of the
problem is the lack of cooperation from other public oversight institutions
(Contraloría, Superintendencia de Bancos, Superintendencia de Companías). These agencies see the work of the CCCC as
threatening their sphere of competence, and therefore are reluctant to turn
over information on suspected corrupt activities of those organisations or
individuals that fall under their jurisdiction. This lack of cooperation is also
attributed to the institutionalised corruption in these same organisations, which cover up
corruption acts because they involve political appointees at the highest levels
and their financial supporters in the private sector. According to CCCC officers, the very agencies set up to control
public and private sector activities, are the first to cover-up incidents of
corruption, acting with total impunity.
This is a sad but true statement of the degree of corruption in all
areas of the public sector. Even when
a case is investigated and reaches the prosecution stage, it can sit for years
at the Attorney General’s Office until the offence can no longer be prosecuted
due to time limits, is somehow resurrected by the CCCC or the media, or is
completely forgotten. The second area of work of the CCCC
is corruption prevention and education.
The work of the agency in this area has proven effective at the level of
the general public, which has become more aware and interested in
anti-corruption mechanisms. However, at
the level of public sector organisations, the CCCC has not been able to
penetrate into agencies to review procedures and practices, or recommend
actions to prevent corruption. This is
due to two main factors: first, the CCCC does not have a legal mandate to
intervene in other public agencies. In fact, the law establishes that the
agency must not intervene in the jurisdiction of other agencies, except
in cases where it is investigating corrupt activities; and second, there is
professional jealousy and outright rejection of the intervention of the CCCC in
other agencies by bureaucrats, who view CCCC officers as ‘trouble makers’. Needless to say, the CCCC has had no
significant effect on the practices of the private sector. 3.4.3 Independence and Accountability Although by law the CCCC is
independent in terms of its actions, resources and staff, in reality its power
is severely curtailed, as we have seen, by the inability to perform its
functions properly. As a civil society
control mechanism, the commission’s model is different from other
anti-corruption agencies. The CCCC does
not operate under any government agency or department, and does not have a
statutory responsibility to respond to any public body, although it reports its
activities annually to Congress as a means to publicize its work and provide
transparency and accountability of its actions to the government. The mandate of the commission
requires it to be directly accountable to citizens through the highest level of
its management, the Commissioners, who are elected by civil society
organisations representing a wide variety of interests. Each Commissioner is accountable to the
organisation that elected him/her and is responsible for presenting the work
and results of the CCCC to the respective organisation. 3.4.4
Staffing
and Budget In 2002, the CCCC had 60 staff
members of whom one-third work in the investigations and prevention
departments. The agency has
independence in the hiring and firing of staff, who are selected from the
public and private sector as needed, and become public sector employees
subjected to the civil service code.
The CCCC staff is guided by a code of ethics and values that includes
the following: honesty, truth, justice, independence, equity, solidarity,
efficiency, excellence and team-work
(CCCC, 2002). For fiscal year 2001-2002, the
budget of the agency was USD$ 2 million, assigned by the government in its
annual budget. The limited resources of
the agency allows it only to pursue cases that are deemed a priority, after a
lengthy review to determine the agency’s competence and caseload. The
commission must balance the resources available to work against the accusations
received and also the pre-programmed investigation, prevention and education
activities. This results in the
commission focusing on grand corruption scandals, and leaving very little room
for action on petty corruption or mal-administration issues. 3.4.5
Community
Participation As mentioned before, the CCCC is by
statute a civic anti-corruption control commission, and therefore the ongoing
participation of the community takes place at the highest level of the
agency. Currently, the agency has seven
Commissioners, each representing one of the seven “Electoral Colleges”
(Colegios Electorales): the National Congress of Universities and Polytechnic
Institutes, the National Collegiate of Professionals, the National Association
of Newspaper Editors, TV, Radio and Journalists, The National Federation of
Chambers of Production and Commerce, Worker Unions and Indigenous,
Afro-Ecuadorian and Farmers organisations, National Women’s Rights
organisations, and Human rights organisations and consumer groups. The
Commissioners, selected by each of these bodies, are responsible for
maintaining the organisations informed of the commission’s work, and mobilising
the support of these organisations in the public education and awareness
campaigns that the agency carries out.
The commission has also established a network of citizen groups
(Veedurías Ciudadanas) to act as ‘watchdogs’ in specific public organisations
and processes highly susceptible to corruption, such as the upcoming 2002
Presidential elections. These official monitors act as ‘the eyes and ears’ of
the wider community, and report on the transparency and legality of public
sector activities. The commission also participates in
anti-corruption initiatives and projects with national and international NGOs
and civil society organisations. It publishes materials on corruption and
corruption control, and has been instrumental in mobilising the media to expose
corruption scandals. Chapter 4 - Anti-corruption Agencies, Good Practice
Guidelines What lessons can the Ecuadorian
Civic Commission for the Control of Corruption (CCCC) learn from the examples
of Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana’s specialised anti-corruption
agencies? 4.1 Clear,
strong and enforceable legal framework The basis for an effective
anti-corruption agency, is the support of a legal framework that clearly sets
the scope of action of the agency, provides it with all the tools necessary to
perform its functions effectively, and that can be enforced by the agency
through the justice system. In the case
of the CCCC, even though the agency’s creation is embedded into the
Constitution, the regulations that normalize the work of the CCCC are too
general, and give it limited powers to conduct investigations, weakening its
mandate and virtually ‘tying its hands’. In order to give the CCCC the
‘teeth’ it requires, the regulations must be modified to give the Commission
complete accessibility to information for its investigations, including a
mechanism, possibly through the courts, to force agencies to collaborate with
the investigations when these organisations are unwilling to do so through
regular channels. The CCCC should have
the ability to monitor the assets and incomes of politicians and top-level
bureaucrats, the power to freeze assets of suspects under investigation, to
seize documents, property and passports to prevent the accused from fleeing the
country, and to arrest suspects if necessary.
Currently the CCCC does not have any provisions to protect informers or
‘whistleblowers’. The ability to
provide legal as well as physical protection to witnesses is required in order
to encourage civil servants and citizens to denounce cases of corruption. A key and
possibly contentious issue is the need to grant the commission prosecutorial
powers. This recommendation is not easy to formulate. However, in light of the current situation where the cases that
the agency investigates are seldom prosecuted by a politicised Attorney
General’s Office and those guilty of corruption are set free by a corrupt
judiciary, this may be the only alternative available to actually make sure
that those found guilty of corruption are punished according to the law. There are, on the other hand, difficult
issues regarding an agency that has both investigative and prosecutorial powers
that must be considered. There is the
potential misuse of power by the CCCC’s prosecutors, overzealous behaviour in
prosecuting corruption, and the potential capture of the agency by political or
bureaucratic forces for the prosecution of opponents. However,
in the particular case of the CCCC, its structure as a civic commission with
the highest levels of administration and decision-making in the hands of civil
society and its representatives, the potential for these dangers to occur may
be less. Additionally, the CCCC could
establish ‘popular justice tribunals’, whereby members monitor the prosecution
of cases and the performance of the judicial system, reporting any corruption
or mismanagement of cases, and in the process, helping to root out corruption
within the courts as well. 4.2 Independence
and freedom of Action Hong
Kong’s ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB have been very successful because, among other
things, their independence of resources, structure and power guarantees their
freedom of action. In the case of
Ecuador’s CCCC, although it is free from political and bureaucratic
interference and has the ability to hire and fire its staff, its independence
is curtailed by the lack of power and limited resources. The power and independence of the agency
could be expanded by allowing it to supplement its formal budget with proceeds
from the sale of assets and properties of those found guilty of corrupt and
illegal acts. This additional income
could help to finance the recruitment and training of specialised prosecutors
for its prosecution department, as well as financially rewarding the work of
members of the “popular justice tribunals”.
Additional resources could also serve to improve the salaries and
working conditions of the staff, and deter CCCC officers from becoming corrupt
themselves. 4.3 ‘Four Point’ System for fighting
corruption The fight
against systemic and institutionalised corruption is a long-term
commitment. The agencies in Hong Kong
and Singapore have travelled down this road for a long time, while Botswana’s
DCEC and the Ecuadorian CCCC are just beginning their journey. A model similar to Hong Kong’s ICAC
three-pronged approach should be followed by the commission, adding a fourth
dimension, prosecution, making it a ‘four point system’ where the
concepts of education and prevention complement investigation and prosecution,
making these four areas interdependent and supportive of each other. It is important that in pursuing its ‘four
point system’ for combating corruption, the CCCC adopt a systematic but
flexible and proactive position of learning and changing as the conditions of its
tasks alter. The need is evident, as
the agency becomes better positioned, stronger and more successful, so will the
corrupt find more complex mechanisms to continue avoiding the law, forcing the
commission to focus on more effective investigative instruments. The
commission should place special emphasis on strategies to prevent corruption,
for if the structural conditions that give rise to corruption in the first
place are not tackled, the agency’s work of merely punishing corruption will
not have a lasting and positive effect.
The CCCC must act as an advisor to government reformers, the political
and bureaucratic leaders who need to pursue a holistic process of systematic
public sector reforms to minimise the opportunities for corrupt and illegal activities
in government agencies. First and
foremost, this reform process should be directed at changing and strengthening
the structure of the key government control agencies: Attorney General’s
Office, Comptroller Department, Banking Superintendence, and Companies
Superintendence, in order to guarantee
their independence from political influence and interference. Other key areas, similar to the “corruption
niches” identified by the CCCC, should be the focus of a review of procedures
and administrative processes, and then subjected to structural reforms to
eliminate the opportunities for corruption. 4.4 Cooperation, community involvement and
accountability The CCCC
must recognise that in the fight
against corruption it cannot act alone, nor can it can single-handedly
eliminate corrupt behaviour. It must be
the leader and key instrument of a national anti-corruption system, made up of
all the government agencies that have the mandate to regulate public and private
sector activities, together with private sector and civil society allies. Cooperation among all of these organisations
is crucial for the success of the national anti-corruption strategy. In terms
of community involvement and accountability, the CCCC’s model of having seven
Commissioners, responsible and accountable to each of the constituencies that
elected them, provides an innovative mechanism to involve civil society and to
ensure public support for the anti-corruption agency’s work, as well as
offering a strong accountability mechanism. In this structure, the CCCC’s Executive Director, elected by the
seven Commissioners, cannot be easily subjected to political or other types of
pressure, as she/he does not owe its position to any individual or bureaucratic
organisation, and therefore does not have hidden loyalties to maintain. Apart from
being accountable to citizens, the CCCC
should also be legally accountable to Congress and maintain a good relationship
with the President’s office, which in Ecuador, as in many presidential systems
of government, is a very powerful political and bureaucratic organisation. Chapter 5 - Conclusion Corruption is not a ‘necessary
evil’. On the contrary, its immorality is heightened because of its effects on
the poorest and most disadvantaged members of society. However, it is not just a moral issue. The
economic cost of corruption is staggering.
In 2000, it is estimated that corruption costs governments hundreds of
billions of dollars annually (TI, 2002.)
In Ecuador alone, the Civic Commission for the Control of Corruption
(CCCC) estimated that corruption represented a loss to the state of over USD$
2,000 million, enough resources to build dozens of hospitals and schools,
thousands of kilometres of roads and water supply mains, and enough to support
productive programs that provide employment and welfare to hundreds of
communities. On the other hand, the
costs to the moral fabric of a nation are far beyond what any organisation can
express in monetary terms. The fight against pervasive,
institutionalised corruption is a daunting task, yet it is as necessary as
breathing for the survival of a government, a state, or a civilised
society. This fight needs to be
systematic, incremental and collective, guided by a national anti-corruption
strategy that institutes structural reforms to minimize the opportunities for
corruption in institutions, establishes ethical codes of conduct and strategies
that stigmatise corrupt behaviour, and uses the power of punishment to
effectively deter corrupt activity. Anti-corruption agencies in
countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana have proven to be
successful operational arms of this national effort to reduce corruption. The experience of these agencies suggests
that their efforts must not be isolated from other anti-corruption mechanisms,
but that they must work simultaneously to enforce, prevent and punish illegal
activities in both the public and private sectors. Their success is also based on a strong legal framework that
provides them with the power to conduct their strategies, the cooperation and
determination of other government agencies to fight corruption, the political
willingness and leadership to support the agency’s actions, and the involvement
and support of the wider community in expanding, disseminating and practicing
the anti-corruption message. Perhaps the most inspiring lesson that
countries fighting institutionalised corruption can learn from the experience
of Hong Kong, Singapore and Botswana, is the fact that public perceptions can
be changed and ‘cultural’ traits, such as ‘gift giving’, which are usually used
as examples to justify some types of corruption, can be modified to conform to
ethical codes of conduct that inhibit corrupt behaviour and to promote
legality, transparency and accountability in public and private institutions. The 2001 Corruption Perceptions
Index
Source: Transparency International, CPI, 2001.
Government, Harvard University. Birmingham,
April 22, 2002 Dear Dr. Pryor: Below, please find a short article and web link to
Probidad, an international anti-corruption agency that I think you will find
interesting regarding corruption at the highest levels in Latin America. I decided to write to you because I understand your
Institute has Dr. Jamil Mahuad, former President of my country, Ecuador, as a
fellow, who has had the privilege of teaching students at your Institution
regarding politics and government. As a MSC student at the International Development
Department, School of Public Policy, of the University of Birmingham in the
U.K. I am currently writing my dissertation about corruption in
Ecuador, and find it difficult, to say the least, that Dr. Mahuad has anything
positive to contribute to your prestigious organisation under the circumstances
that surrounded his Presidency, from his election to his flight from the
country amidst a scandal of corruption and the worst economic crisis
brought on by his (and his team's) management of the country's affairs. Dr Mahuad has been accused by the Supreme Court of
Justice of receiving over 3 million dollars towards his presidential election,
in return for covering up and salvaging Banco del Progreso, whose owner, Dr.
Fernando Aspiazu is currently in jail facing charges of mismanagement of funds,
fraud, among others. His illegal acceptance of funds from Dr. Aspiazu led
to the dissolution of his political party and the indictment of fellow party
leaders that are now facing trial. This is only one of the formal accusations against Dr.
Mahuad, whose lack of leadership, mediocrity and false image of rectitude, led
the country to an economic crisis as the financial institutions that
he supported collapsed, leaving millions of people without their live savings,
even causing many to commit suicide out of desperation. As new information about his dealings with fellow
President Fujimori of Peru (also ousted on corruption charges) begin
to emerge regarding the famous "peace process”, the country is
bracing for what we all suspect, that there were more than diplomatic
negotiations transcending behind the scenes. Dr. Mahuad has no moral authority to be teaching
anything, except maybe how to destroy a country in less than a year. If
he had any moral character, he would go back to Ecuador to face the justice
system and the consequences of his actions as the worse President in the
history of Ecuador. Respectfully yours,
Maria
del Mar Landette M. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attachment: http://probidad.org/regional/recursos/galeria Bibliography
Ades A., Di Tella R. (1995) “Competition
and Corruption” Applied Economics Discussion Paper Series 169 Oxford:
Oxford University. Bardham P. (1997) “Corruption
and Development: A review of issues” Journal of Economic Literature,
35:1320-1346. Botswana Directorate of
Corruption and Economic Crime, DCEC (2002) accessed through: www.gov/bw/government/directorate Clarke M. ( 1983) “Corruption. Causes, Consequences and Control” London: Frances Pinter Publishers. De Speville B. (1997) “Hong Kong
Policy Initiatives Against Corruption” Paris: OECD. Doig A (1995) “Good government and
Sustainable Anti-corruption Strategies: A Role for Independent Anti-Corruption
Agencies?” Public Administration
and Development, 15 (2): 151-165. Doig A., Riley S. (1998) “Corruption
and Anti-corruption Strategies: issues and case studies from developing
countries” in UNDP/OECD “Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives
in Developing Countries. New York: UNDP Doig A., McIvor S. (1999) “Corruption
and its control in the developmental context: an analysis and selective review
of the literature” Third World
Quarterly, 20 (3) 657-676. Ecuador Commission for the Civic
Control of Corruption, CCCC (2002), accessed through: http://www.comisionanticorrupcion.com/ Geddes B. and Ribeiro Neto A. (1999) “Institutional
Sources of Corruption in Brazil” in Rosenn K. and Downes R. “Corruption and
Political Reform: The impact of Collor’s Impeachment” Coral Gables: North South
Center Press. Heywood P. (1997) “Political
Corruption: Problems and Perspectives” Political Studies, 45: 416-435. Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, ICAC
(2002), accessed through : www.icac.org.hk/ Hors I. (2000) “Dealing with
Corruption in Developing Countries” in “No Longer Business as Usual” Paris:
OECD Development Centre. Husted B. (2002) “Culture and
International anti-Corruption Agreements in Latin America” Journal of
Business Ethics, 37: 413-422. Hutchcroft P. (1997) “The politics
of privilege: assessing the impact of rents, corruption and clientelism on
Third World development” Political
Studies, 45 (3) Kaufmann D. (1998) “Revisiting
Anti-Corruption Strategies” in Corruption and Integrity Improvement
Initiatives in Developing Countries. Washington D.C: UNDP/OECD. Klitgaard R (1988) “Controlling
Corruption” Berkley: University of California Press. Klitgaard R., Mclean R., Abaroa H.,
Parris L. (2000) “ Corrupt Cities, a practical guide to cure and prevention” California: Institute for Contemporary
Studies, ICS Press. Langseth P, Stapenhurst R. and Pope J.
(2000) “ The Role of a National Integrity System in Fighting Corruption” EDI Working Papers, Washington D.C: World
Bank. Larbi G. (2000) “ Improving
Integrity in Public Service in Ethiopia: Recommendations for the Establishment
of Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission” Birmingham: University of
Birmingham. Larbi G. (2001) “ Institutional and
Organisational Arrangements and Mechanisms for Managing and Controlling Corruption
– A review” Birmingham: University
of Birmingham. Lui F. (1985) “An
Equilibrium Queing Model of Bribery” Journal of Political Economy, 93:
760-781. Manga Fombad C. (1999) “Curbing
Corruption in Africa: some lessons from Botswana’s experience” UNESCO: Blackwell Publishers. Mauro P. (1995) “Corruption and
Growth” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 110: 681-712. Mauro P. (1998) “Corruption:
Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Further Research” Finance and
Development (March) 12-14. Myrdal G. (1999) “Corruption: Its
Causes and Effects” in Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine ed. “Political
Corruption” New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers. Morris S. (1991) “Corruption and
Politics in Contemporary Mexico” Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Mukum Mbaku J. (1996) “Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of
Cleanups” Cato Journal, 16 (1) 99-115. OAS (1996) “Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption”
accessed through www.oas.org/en/pinfo/conven/corrupt.htm
OECD (1997) “Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and Related Documents” accessed through http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery OECD (1999) “Public Sector
Corruption. An International Survey of Prevention Measures” Paris: OECD. OECD (2000) “No Longer Business as
Usual” Paris: OECD. Periodistas Frente a la
Corrupción, PFC (2002) accessed through: http://www.cipe.org/pfc PROBIDAD (2002), accessed
through www.probidad.org Pope J. (1999) “The Need for, and
Role of, an Independent Anti-Corruption Agency” Transparency International
Working Paper accessed through http://www.transparency.org/workingpaper Pope J. (2000) “ Confronting
Corruption: The elements of a National Integrity System” in Transparency
International Source Book, 2000. Berlin: T.I. Perry P. (1997) “ Political
Corruption and Political Geography”
University of Canterbury, New Zealand: Ashgate Publishing. Quah J. (1999) “ Accountability and
Anticorruption Agencies in the Asia Pacific Region” in “Combating
Corruption in Asian and Pacific Economies” Paper presented at the Joint
ADB-OECD Workshop. Manila, ADB. Quah J. (1999) “Singapore’s
Experience in Curbing Corruption” in Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine ed.
“Political Corruption, a Handbook” New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Quah J. (2001) “Combating
Corruption in the Asia Pacific Region” in Caiden, Dwivedi and Jabbra, ed. “
Where Corruption Lives” Connecticut: Kumarian Press. Quansah E.K. (1994) “The Corruption
and Economic Crime Act of Botswana”
Journal of Africa Law, 38 (2): 191-196. Rose-Ackerman S. (1999) “Corruption and Government,
Causes, Consequences and Reform”
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singapore Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau, CPIB (2002) accessed through: www.cpib.gov.sg Tanzi V. and Davoodi H. (1997) “Corruption
, Public Investment and Growth” IMF Working Paper, 139. Washington D.C.:
IMF. Theobald R. (1990) “Corruption,
Development and Underdevelopment”
London: Macmillian Press. Transparency International (2000) “ Transparency
International Source Book 2000” Germany: T.I. Transparency International (2001) “Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index” accessed through: www:transparency.org/cpi/htm Transparency International (2002) “ Transparency
International Annual Report, 2001” accessed through: www:transparency.org United Nations Development Programme
(1997) “Corruption and Good Governance” New York: UNDP. Wade R. (1983) “The System of
Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India”
Journal of Development Studies, 18: 287-327. Williams R. (1987) “Political
corruption in Africa” Aldershot: Gower. Williams R. and Doig A. ed. (2000) “Controlling
Corruption” Cheltenham: Elgar Publishers. Williams R. and Theobald R. ed. (2000)
“Corruption in the Developing World” Cheltenham: Elgar Publishers. World Bank (1997a) “Helping
Countries Combat Corruption. The role of the World Bank” Washington D.C.:
World Bank. World Bank (1997b) “World
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World” New York: Oxford University Press. [1] [1]
For an explanation of Public Choice theory see James M. Buchanan et al, The
Economics of Politics . (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978). For recent public choice literature on
corruption, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes,
Consequences and Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). [2]
For information on PROBIDAD go to www.probidad.org. Also contact Periodistas Frente a la
Corrupcion, PFC (journalists against corruption) at www.portal-pfc.org [3]
Independent Comission Against Corruption, ICAC : www.icac.org.hk/ [4] Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau, CPIB: www.cpib.gov.sg [5] Directorate of Corruption and
Economic Crime, DCEC: www.gov/bw/government/directorate
[6] For a Who’s Who of Corrupt
politicians in Ecuador see “Carcel de papel” in: www:comisionanticorruption.com For a ‘gallery’ of corrupt high level politicians in Latin America
see http://www.probidad.org/regional/recursos/galeria. |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
