range of positions. The Congress controlled 70 percent of seats in parliament and held power in most states between 1951 and 1967. This period of one-party dominance has been referred to as the Congress “system” in Indian politics. However, the power struggle between Indira Gandhi (Nehru’s daughter, who was prime minister from 1966 to 1977 and 1980 to 1984) and the Congress organization led to the party split in 1969. The majority followed Mrs. Gandhi to her “New Congress” or “Congress (R)” (R for “ruling”), which was recognized by the election commission as the “real” INC. Mrs. Gandhi’s leadership of the Congress led to the deinstitutionalization of the party as she undermined the federal character of the party by stopping party elections and concentrating power in her own hands.

The Congress lost its dominant position for the first time in ninety years with its defeat in the 1977 elections, held after the unpopular Emergency Rule Mrs. Gandhi had imposed in 1975. Faced with criticism of her leadership, Mrs. Gandhi split the party a second time, in 1978, and formed the breakaway Congress (I) (I for “Indira”). The Congress (I) returned her to power in 1980, but she was assassinated in 1984. Mrs. Gandhi was succeeded by her older son Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), who lost power in the 1989 elections. When Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991, the party presidency was offered to his widow, Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946), who declined the offer. Although the party held power from 1991 to 1996, the Congress was in decline as a national party due primarily to the lackluster leaderships of P. V. Narasimha Rao (1921–2004) and Sitaram Kesri (1919–2000). In 1998 Sonia Gandhi was elected party president and started rebuilding the party, especially by expanding its support base among Muslims and the poor. Her leadership did not help the party win the 1999 elections, and a small number of Congress (I) leaders led by Sharad Pawar (b. 1940), who questioned the likelihood of foreign-born Gandhi becoming prime minister, formed a breakaway party in 1999 (the Nationalist Congress Party). Nevertheless, Gandhi’s leadership energized and revitalized the Congress (I) Party. In the 2004 parliamentary elections the Congress won enough seats to form a coalition government with the support of about a dozen center-left parties. Gandhi, however, declined to become prime minister; instead she remained the party president, and Manmohan Singh (b. 1932) became prime minister. The Congress expects that Rajiv and Sonia’s son Rahul Gandhi (b. 1970), who won a parliamentary seat in 2004, will play a significant role in the party in the near future.

SEE ALSO Anticolonial Movements; Civil Disobedience; Congress Party, India; Democracy; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahandas K.; Indian National Army

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INDICATIVE PLANNING
SEE Convergence Theory.

INDICATORS, LAGGING, LEADING, AND COINCIDENT
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INDIGENISMO
Broadly defined, indigenismo (Spanish, “indianism”) refers to the representation of indigenous peoples (indígenas in
Spanish) in Latin America by outsiders (called indigenistas). It is a uniquely American phenomenon, and its origins are inextricably bound together with debates on the question of how colonized indigenous peoples should be treated. Its importance as a philosophical aspect of Latin American thought dates to the beginnings of European attempts to subdue the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continent in the late fifteenth century. It reached its high point in the early twentieth century in countries with high concentrations of indigenous peoples, particularly Mexico and Peru. Although its characteristics changed over time, indigenismo always presented a critique of indigenous issues from an elite, educated, urban perspective rather than from that of the indigenous peoples.

The Dominican priest Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566) presented the earliest articulate defense of indigenous rights from a European perspective. But he retained loyalty to the Catholic Church and to the Spanish Crown, and ultimately the purpose of his efforts was for the conversion of indigenous peoples to Christianity and their assimilation into the Spanish kingdom.

Modern indigenismo first emerged in the nineteenth century and was characterized by romantic and humanitarian impulses. This indigenista discourse came to be dominated by intellectuals who were strongly influenced by Spencerian positivist thought meant to assimilate the surviving indigenous peoples in the Americas into a dominant Spanish or Portuguese culture. Indigenismo particularly gained strength in Mexico in the aftermath of the 1910 revolution because it embraced the country’s glorious indigenous past while assimilating their descendants into a unified mestizo nation.

By the 1920s indigenismo had become a form of protest against the injustices that Indians faced. Political parties, especially populist ones, began to exploit indigenista ideologies for political gain. Indigenismo flourished in the 1930s, particularly in Peru and Mexico, and in the 1950s it was institutionalized in the Guatemalan and Bolivian revolutions. With officialization, indigenismo lost its revolutionary potential to improve the lives of Indians. Elite mestizo intellectuals and leftist political leaders led this movement, which they often used only to advance their own political agendas.

Indigenismo often emerged out of anthropological and archaeological studies. Manuel Gamio (1883–1960) was both a pioneer anthropologist and indigenista in Mexico who reconstructed archaeological sites for tourists, including Teotihuacán north of Mexico City. Although indigenistas proudly championed the ancient Aztec and Inca civilizations, they often ignored or discounted their present-day descendants.

Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui is one of the best-known indigenista intellectuals. In Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality (1928), Mariátegui criticized various strategies that others had employed to improve the lives of indigenous peoples, including humanitarian campaigns, administrative policies, and legal reforms. He argued that their problems were rooted instead in the nature of the land-tenure system, and that only through fundamental economic change and land reform would social improvements be possible. Mariátegui was an indigenista in the classical sense in that he was an urban mestizo intellectual who had little contact with Peru’s indigenous peoples, but he did not portray the worst elements of paternalism and assimilation common to indigenismo.

Indigenismo was also represented in literature, particularly in well-known novels such as Jorge Icaza’s Huasipungo (1934) in Ecuador or Rosario Castellanos’s Balún-Cañán (1957) in Mexico. Typically, such novels focused on the oppression of poor indigenous agricultural workers at the hands of large landholders, depicting indígenas as primitive and ignorant people who are unable to improve their lives without outside assistance. The solution, when one is offered, is that through education they might be elevated and assimilated into the dominant culture; rarely are indigenous cultures recognized as valuable and worthy of protection. In art, the paintings by the Mexican artists Frida Kahlo (1907–1954) and Diego Rivera (1886–1957) utilized indigenous themes to advance their leftist political ideologies.

In 1940 the Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas (1895–1970) organized the First Inter-American Indigenist Congress at Pátzcuaro in the state of Michoacán. Delegates were anthropologists and sociologists as well as religious workers and high government officials such as John Collier, the architect of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Indian policy in the United States. The Pátzcuaro Congress broke from colonialist thought, but its tone was still integrationist. The Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III, Inter-American Indigenist Institute) that emerged out of the Pátzcuaro Congress was based in Mexico City, and Gamio served as its first director. The III held congresses about every five years, and indigenistas formed national branches in many of the American republics. In addition to publishing the journals América Indigenista (later renamed Anuario Indigenista) and Boletín Indigenista, the III became an official organ of the Organization of American States (OAS).

In 1971 eleven anthropologists gathered in Barbados for the Symposium on Inter-Ethnic Conflict in South America. Their Declaration of Barbados demanded the liberation of indigenous peoples from colonial domination, specifically calling for the defense of indigenous culture and territory, the establishment of economic, social, educational, and health assistance, and support for a native-led pan–Latin American movement for self-government.
As indigenous peoples began to build their own organizations, they presented a sustained critique of *indigenismo* as a construction of the dominant culture, a paternalistic impulse designed to stop liberation movements. Indigenous peoples criticized academics who studied their cultures without returning any political benefits to their communities. Rather than letting outsiders appropriate indigenous cultures and concerns for their own purposes, indigenous leaders insisted that they could represent themselves. Particularly strong indigenous political movements emerged in countries with relatively weak *indigenista* traditions such as Ecuador and Guatemala. By the end of the twentieth century indigenous leaders had created a *neoindigenismo* that advanced their own political agendas.

**INDIGENOUS RIGHTS**

Indigenous rights are those legal and moral rights claimed by indigenous peoples. But what is meant by “indigenous peoples,” and in what sense are their rights peculiar to them? From what source do these rights flow? Are they legal rights granted by the state, or are they moral rights that have yet to be established in law? Or are they human rights, derived from those basic rights ascribed to human beings everywhere? The situation of indigenous peoples also raises further questions about the nature of these rights: Are they individual rights or group rights, social and political rights or cultural rights? And finally, against whom or what are they claimed? The state within which they live, or the international community as a whole—or both?

**INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE HISTORY OF COLONIZATION**

But first, who counts as an indigenous people? This is a complex and politically loaded question, both in domestic and international contexts. First of all, there are disputes over who or what counts as “indigenous.” Secondly, there are disputes over who counts as a “people” in international law, especially when it comes to ascribing and distributing the right to self-determination. There are two basic approaches to the question of indigeneity. First, one can link indigeneity to literal first residency or occupation of a particular territory. Contemporary indigenous peoples in this case would be descendants of the earliest populations living in that area. Second, one can tie indigeneity to those peoples who lived in that territory before settlers arrived and the process of colonization began. This relativizes the definition to prior occupation rather than first occupation. Although there is enormous diversity among the many different indigenous nations in the world, another common dimension to their self-description as indigenous is the connection to land; as James Anaya has put it, they are indigenous in the sense that “their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they live … much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands” (Anaya 1996, p. 3). Still, the term remains unsettled in international law and domestic practice. Given the diversity of peoples in question and the complexity of circumstances in which the claims are being made (for example, not just in the Americas and Australasia, but also in South and Southeast Asia), many have argued that indigeneity should be interpreted in as flexible and “constructivist” a manner as possible (Kingsbury 1998; 2001).

From the perspective of indigenous peoples at least, it is important to distinguish their claims from the claims of other minority groups, such as migrants or refugees, because they are challenging the extent to which their incorporation into the state (and its subsequent consequences) was just. The question of legitimacy looms much larger with regard to indigenous peoples than it does with other minority groups. Often precisely because their claims are distinct in this way they are controversial. They challenge liberal conceptions of distributive justice and the underlying conceptions of equality and individual rights that tend to presuppose the legitimacy question is moot. Although they challenge these conceptions, it is not clear that the claims of indigenous peoples are fundamentally incompatible with them (Kymlicka 1989, 1995; compare Barry 2001, Alfred 1999). However, the historical experience of indigenous peoples in the course of the development of liberal democracy in the Americas and Australasia suggests that the challenges they face are profound. Hence the ambiguity surrounding the appeal to the language of rights.