and enslavement in colonial New Mexico, Chihuahua, and Cuba as a destination for deported Indian prisoners—the latter being a fascinating topic that has not previously been covered in detail.

Whereas most studies focus on violence and military confrontations with Spanish, Mexican, and American newcomers to Apacheria, Conrad’s revisionist account analyzes mobility in its many forms, including most prominently captivity and enslavement, to explain a colonizing process that forcibly removed members of the tribe to locations all across North American and the Caribbean Basin. All five elements of diaspora—migration, collective memory of ancestral homes, ongoing connections to ancestral homes, sustained group consciousness, and sense of kinship across places—are clearly present throughout Apache history (2–3). By the time US troops began occupying and patrolling Southern Apache homelands in the mid-nineteenth century, the tribe’s Bedonkohe, Chihene, Chokonen, and Nedni subgroups had been demographically and militarily weakened by more than two centuries of displacement. Conrad’s revealing book demonstrates that this diaspora has been an underappreciated aspect of the tribe’s diminishing power over time, but he simultaneously shows how the tribe skillfully adapted to incorporate mobility, which “challenged the interests of imperial invaders,” into strategies of resistance and survival (5).

In addition to its analytical focus on diaspora and its anecdotal emphasis on individual men, women, and children who experienced forced displacements, The Apache Diaspora addresses an array of specific topics within tribal and regional history. A cursory overview of these topics includes Southern Apache enslavement in seventeenth-century Santa Fe households and in the mines of Parral, Plains Apache (Lipan and Jicarilla) movement into New Mexico and Texas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spanish military campaigns into Apacheria in the late 1700s, establecimientos de paz (peace establishments) as a policy approach in the early 1800s, the deportation of captives to Cuba as an “Apache Middle Passage” (143), Mexican policies in the 1830s and 1840s that included scalp bounties as a form of genocidal warfare, strategies to counteract American militarization of Apacheria after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Cochise’s approaches to diplomacy and warfare in the 1860s and 1870s, removal to Alabama and Florida after Geronimo’s surrender in 1886, the boarding-school experience at Carlisle, and forced relocation to the Fort Sill and Mescalero reservations after Apaches were finally released from “prisoner-of-war status” in the early twentieth century (287).

This book focuses on a single tribal nation, but it should be read by all scholars of American Indian history and North American history because its careful rethinking of indigenous responses to colonialism has implications for many other times, places, and peoples. The Apache Diaspora is at once a synthesis narrative and a detailed case study, a colonial policy history and an Indigenous-centered work of ethnohistory, a top-down look at familiar Indian figures and a bottom-up account of previously unknown Native actors. In every respect, Conrad has produced a model for studying and writing about American Indian history, and his work should initiate an historiographic wave in the coming years that will further transform the way we think about colonialism in North America.

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Contrary to what this book’s title suggests, The CIA in Ecuador is not about the political activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Nor, author Marc Becker assures the reader early on, is the book about diplomatic strategy or covert operations (7). Instead, it is a social history of the Partido Comunista de Ecuador (PCE [Communist Party of Ecuador]), drawing primarily on raw field intelligence produced by CIA case officers in charge of keeping tabs on Communist activity in Ecuador during the first decade of the Cold War. Rather than draw on national security policy repositories, such as the US presidential libraries, Becker’s book relies mainly on CIA situation reports and nonpolicy analytical documents that have been declassified and made available via the online CIA Records Search Tool (CREST).

As a reference work on the PCE and its internal debates about financing and strategy, Becker’s book is exceedingly rich. The CIA in Ecuador provides excellent coverage of many aspects of the PCE during the early Cold War: its intricate internal debates about a rural- or urban-first strategy in the late 1940s, its futile attempts to forge a broader electoral coalition in 1952 and 1956, its leadership quarrels at the 1952 and 1957 PCE congresses, its eightfold legal complaint and twelve-hour censure trial against a conservative minister of government in 1953, its ambivalent position toward the third presidency of populist José María Velasco Ibarra (1952–1956), and the financial troubles faced by the party’s publications and cultural activities in the mid-1950s. For these revelations, Becker’s book holds great value for anyone interested in Communist operations in Ecuador, or elsewhere in 1950s Latin America. At its best (chapters 5–11), Becker complements CIA material with press reporting, Communist Party documents, and third-country diplomatic reports, which helps to fill in a broader narrative.
While explicitly foregoing analysis of US national security policy strategy, Becker does engage in significant critiques of the CIA’s work of intelligence gathering. This takes place mainly in chapters 3 and 4, where Becker claims that the agency held exaggerated views about the Ecuadoran Communist Party’s interest in revolutionary activity and its foreign financing, respectively. According to Becker, this stemmed from US officials’ “paranoid and irrational fear of the PCE” (44) and their “pathological urge to uncover external sources of funding” (54). Yet at no point did the CIA appear to fabricate evidence against the PCE, and its deft use of penetration agents, including the PCE’s own treasurer (59), permits Becker to simultaneously conclude that the Communist Party was relatively uninterested in revolutionary activity and that its finances were paltry throughout the 1950s. This creates an unresolved contradiction between the book’s argument that the CIA exaggerated PCE subversive aims and foreign roots while also presuming to hold agency reporting as the gold standard to disprove these same assertions. Elsewhere in the book, Becker continues to use accurate CIA reporting as evidence of prior CIA pathology, ultimately conceding that agency sources boasted “intimate knowledge of the Communist Party’s inner workings” (73, 74, 78, 137).

As Becker acknowledges, one reason for this apparent contradiction is the book’s omission of CIA covert action as a causal factor to explain the constant search for evidence of alleged PCE misdeeds. While not reflected in the declassified CREST material, US national security policy charged the CIA not only with keeping tabs on Communist Parties around the world but also with the task of weakening them. This suggests that the CIA was not “inadvertently” discovering a weak and financially strapped PCE (57), but rather that the agency was looking for any shred of evidence to use in political activities to discredit the PCE as a subversive tool of Moscow. What Becker describes as a “pathological urge” (54) was a sound, if aggressive, political strategy, approved at the highest level of the United States government. Aware of Washington’s goals in this psychological war, Moscow and its allies tended to provide Latin American Communist parties with limited funding, often seed money or gifts-in-kind, such as a broadsheet press they could use to print newspapers and then creditably claim that party finances were largely raised from local sources.

For more information on the competing political strategies of the CIA and the PCE, Becker could have drawn on a broader array of sources from Washington or Moscow. His questions about sensitive covert activities might have been answered by national security files at the US presidential libraries, or by the Hoover Institution’s collection from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The former often describe how CIA activities fit into the White House’s overall political goals, while the latter reveals some of the precise, albeit limited, sums of Soviet subsidies to the PCE. Another source that is underutilized is CIA defector Philip Agee’s account of agency activities, including during his time at the Ecuador station in the early 1960s. On page 187, for example, Becker speculates that the CIA station failed to recruit two PCE members in 1957, citing their continued membership in the party. Yet Agee describes these men as among the agency’s most reliable penetration agents deep into the 1960s.

Engagingly written, The CIA in Ecuador is best read as an empirically reliable account of the detailed activities of the Communist Party of Ecuador during the first ten years of the Cold War. At the same time, its value as a secondary source regarding the CIA is hampered by its reliance on CIA situation reports at the expense of fully contextualized diplomatic and intelligence policy documents located in repositories beyond the Agency’s online CREST system.

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In his exploration of the global spread of Rotary clubs in the first half of the twentieth century, Brendan Goff chose to provide a series of case studies of local Rotary clubs in places such as Wichita (in chapter 3), Tokyo (in chapter 4), and Havana (in chapter 5) rather than an overarching institutional history of Rotary organization. These case studies are embedded in the larger narratives of (Wilsonian) civic internationalism, cultural diplomacy, and global American influence. Goff successfully argues in his book, Rotary International and the Selling of American Capitalism, that the global expansion of Rotary clubs in the 1920s and 1930s provides an important counterfactual narrative to the American failure of international engagement and the retreat of the United States into isolationism. When the American government retreated, American businessmen—the major story line—took up the task of spreading American values abroad. American society and the American business community of the American heartland were, according to Goff, much less isolationist and nativist than the American political elites.

The focus on a civic organization such as the Rotary organization seems to support transnational approaches that have privileged nonstate actors over state actors. The Rotary clubs were as Goff repeatedly invokes in his book nonstate actors and civic